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THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN 
AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT. By Thomas J. Curry.' New York and Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press. 1986. Pp. viii, 276. Cloth, $28.00; 
paper, $10.95. 
Michael W. McConnel/2 
Of the recent books on the history and meaning of the religion 
clauses of the first amendment, this one stands out-for its objectiv-
ity, its clarity, and most of all its genuine usefulness in understand-
ing the religion clauses. For the first seven of its eight chapters, The 
First Freedoms is a historian's history, a readable and undogmatic 
account of the controversies over religious freedom in each of the 
thirteen colonies from their founding to the ratification of the Con-
stitution. These episodes provide an indispensable background for 
understanding the framers' work in 1789. 
Only in the last chapter, on the drafting of the first amendment 
itself, does Curry begin to encroach on lawyers' territory and adopt 
some of the lawyers' vices. There he allows the agenda and the 
terms of debate to be set by the controversies of today. There he 
begins to lose the authentic voice of the historical struggle for reli-
gious freedom. 
To understand the importance of the book, one must recognize 
the peculiar nature of the modem debate over church-state relations 
in the United States. That debate began with the famous dissents of 
Justice Rutledge in Everson and Justice Reed in McCollum, during 
the 1946 and 1947 Terms. Each based his opinion on the historical 
origins of the religion clauses, but the two men reached quite differ-
ent conclusions. Justice Rutledge concluded that the framers in-
tended "to create a complete and permanent separation of the 
spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively 
forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion." Justice 
Reed, on the other hand, stated the governing principle as follows: 
"[t]he state cannot influence one toward religion against his will or 
punish him for his beliefs." 
Rutledge thus stood for separation, Reed for voluntarism. The 
two interpretations, while pointing the same way in many cases, 
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have quite different-even contradictory-implications. Not all 
contacts between government and religion pose a threat to religious 
choice, and an artificial divorcement can have the perverse effect of 
eliminating religious choice within areas of life supported, regu-
lated, or even touched by government. 
The Supreme Court adopted Rutledge's essential position 
(though from time to time it has recoiled from the practical conse-
quences). So thorough was the intellectual victory that many 
Americans now think that "separation of church and state" is the 
constitutional command. Even some scholars have referred to the 
establishment clause as the "separation clause. "3 The Supreme 
Court's doctrine of "entanglement" is the doctrinal expression of 
the Rutledge view.4 
As time wore on, the debate took a mischievous turn. Oppo-
nents of separation began to argue that the establishment clause for-
bids only government recognition of a single church, or group of 
churches. Thus, they contended that "nonpreferential" aid-allo-
cated on a nondiscriminatory basis to all faiths-is constitutionally 
permissible, even if it is coerced from unwilling nonbelievers and 
unrelated to any of the secular purposes of government.s They sup-
ported this view with various statements from the framers to the 
effect that "no particular sect or society ought to be favored or es-
tablished by law"-and especially James Madison's explanation on 
the floor of the House of Representatives that his proposed amend-
ment was designed to allay fears that "one sect might obtain a pre-
eminence, or two combine together, and establish a religion to 
which they would compel others to conform." 
The problem with the nonpreferentialist argument is not so 
much that it is wrong (though it probably is wrong) but that it ob-
scures the real issue. In the great religious controversies of twenti-
eth century America, the ideal of separation has come into more 
frequent conflict with the ideal of freedom than it did in an earlier 
age of minimalist government. As the scope of government expands 
into areas that formerly were private and often religious (such as 
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education and social welfare), excluding religion from the govern-
mental sphere becomes a powerful engine of secularization. Since 
1840, government has become the principal source of funds for ele-
mentary and secondary education. Must that financial leverage be 
used in ways that discourage religious choice in education? Since 
the New Deal, numerous regulatory schemes have arisen to control 
the activities of employers and businesses. Should these systems of 
control be extended to the religious sphere? In recent decades, free 
speech rights have been extended to public high school students. 
Should an exception be made for religious speech? These are the 
issues of today, and the nonpreferentialists' argument is of little 
assistance in resolving them. Religion, as such, is not asking for 
"aid," but only that it not be driven to the margins of public life. 
Worse still, the nonpreferentialist argument has been used as a 
justification for invasions of the religious freedom of those who do 
not believe in the existence of a god or adhere to a religious faith. 
With the field divided between advocates of separation and propo-
nents of non preferential aid, the principle of voluntarism has had no 
champion. 
The First Freedoms not only provides the first serious historical 
rebuttal to the nonpreferentialist argument,6 it casts doubt on 
separationism as well. Curry observes that many of those at the 
time of the founding who used seemingly nonpreferentialist lan-
guage were "unmistakably opposed to proposals for non-discrimi-
natory government assistance to religion," giving telling examples. 
John Leland proposed an amendment to the Massachusetts Consti-
tution that the state should never "establish any religion by law, 
[or] give any one sect a preference to another," yet he was also one 
of the most radical opponents of coerced (nonpreferential) support 
for religion. One Massachusetts town, in the very course of de-
nouncing the Commonwealth's system of nondiscriminatory aid, 
stated that "no subordination of any one Sect or Denomination to 
another shall ever be established by law." These examples, and 
others, suggest that nonpreferentialist language should not always 
be taken literally. "Eighteenth-century American history offers 
abundant examples of writers using the concept of preference," ob-
serves Curry, "when, in fact, they were referring to a ban on all 
government assistance to religion." 
Nonetheless, Curry's account does not entirely invalidate the 
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nonpreferentialist thesis. He notes that several states (most notably 
in New England) favored some form of mandatory support for reli-
gion, where individuals could choose which denomination to sup-
port. Substantial minorities in Virginia, Maryland, and possibly 
South Carolina agreed. It is quite possible, on the evidence, that the 
framers of the first amendment were sympathetic to this approach, 
and did not intend to prohibit it. Curry's contrary argument is as 
follows: 
[A]lthough these states demanded that religion in general be supported, no evidence 
sustains the viewpoint that in so doing they saw themselves as opting for a permissi-
ble, non-exclusive establishment. They never described themselves as designing an 
establishment at all. 
Of course they didn't describe their own system as an "establish-
ment"; that was a term of opprobrium, which they reserved for 
single establishments of the sort known in England and formerly 
some of the colonies. The point is that they might not have under-
stood the first amendment's use of the word "establishment" as in-
consistent with a nondiscriminatory scheme of aid. This is the best 
argument for reading the first amendment to keep open the non-
preferentialist alternative. 
Curry makes the mistake of denigrating the best evidence for 
his position: the particular wording adopted by the framers of the 
religion clauses. Professor Laycock has argued that close attention 
to the wording of the various drafts of the amendment strongly sug-
gests that the nonpreferential view was considered and deliberately 
rejected by its framers. 1 Curry, in contrast, assertss that the Senate 
debate over the wording of the amendment should "be seen as a 
discussion about style, not substance." He states that "[t]o examine 
the two clauses of the amendment as a carefully worded analysis of 
Church-State relations would be to overburden them." While he 
may be correct, he weakens his own conclusion and makes close 
study of the framing seem a bit useless. 
While explicitly, if not conclusively, debunking the nonprefer-
entialist interpretation of the religion clauses, The First Freedoms 
also demolishes-tacitly but thoroughly-the separationist reading. 
7. Jd. at 879-85. For example, early in its deliberations the Senate adopted a draft 
proposal that "Congress shall make no law establishing one religious sect or society in prefer-
ence to others." It later adopted a still weaker version: "Congress shall make no law estab-
lishing articles of faith or a mode of worship." These are "nonpreferentialist" alternatives. 
The House of Representatives, however, refused to accede to the Senate's version, and in-
sisted upon the establishment clause in its current form. This appears to reflect a deliberate 
rejection of the nonpreferentialist view. See id. at 880-81. 
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In fascinating detail, Curry describes every important clash between 
religious and civil authority from the founding of the colonies to the 
adoption of the Constitution. Religion was a fertile source for con-
troversy, and the ensuing arguments were varied and impressive. 
Yet not once in that one hundred and sixty-year period was the 
concept of "separation of church and state" invoked. Separation 
was simply not the issue. Liberty of conscience-something akin to 
Reed's voluntarism-was the issue. 
When colonial governors attempted to interfere with the inter-
nal affairs of nonestablished churches-an obvious breach of "sepa-
ration"-this was attacked as a violation of "liberty of conscience." 
When Quakers were required to pay money for the support of Con-
gregational ministers in Massachusetts, they did not complain of a 
breach of "separation," of "aid to religion," or even of "establish-
ment." They appealed to the colony's protections for "liberty of 
conscience." When advocates and opponents of a general assess-
ment for religious teachers squared off in Virginia, they too "con-
cerned themselves with showing whether it violated or did not 
violate freedom of religion." While some breaches of separation 
(what we would now call establishment clause violations) were vig-
orously opposed, this was not on the basis of an abstract adherence 
to separation, but on its practical implications for religious liberty. 
To call the establishment clause the "separation clause" is evidently 
an anachronism. Thomas Jefferson's metaphor of a "wall of separa-
tion" was not coined until the succeeding century. In The First 
Freedoms, the term "separation" is the dog that did not bark. If 
"separation of church and state" were the heart of the matter, one 
would expect to see some mention of it in contemporary sources. 
Curry makes no mention of the absence of evidence for the 
separationist view (other than to comment in the preface that "the 
term 'separation of Church and State' ... obscures rather than clar-
ities the issue"). Yet for every nonpreferentialist on the bench or in 
the academy, there have been two dozen separationists, loudly 
claiming that their construction of the first amendment is rooted in 
history. Given the obvious implication of the historical record, it is 
difficult to understand why Curry attacks nonpreferentialism while 
giving separationism a free ride. 
The separationist interpretation of the establishment clause has 
caused the principles of the two religion clauses to diverge, and even 
to become inconsistent. The establishment clause is seen as prohib-
iting government "benefits" to religion, while the free exercise 
clause is seen as requiring them (under certain circumstances).9 
9. See Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 
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The First Freedoms exposes the error of this view. The framers of 
the first amendment did not set forth two mutually inconsistent 
principles of church-state relations, nonestablishment and free exer-
cise. Both were an outgrowth of the wider term, "liberty of 
conscience." 
As Curry states, "Contemporaries did not, for example, distin-
guish between religious oppression as falling under the ban of the 
'free exercise' clause and a general assessment as being prohibited 
by the 'establishment' clause." The two clauses represented a coor-
dinated expression of the principle of voluntarism in religion-that 
the government may neither force nor prohibit, encourage nor dis-
courage, the practice of religion. An interpretation of the religion 
clauses as in "tension" with one another should be rejected on his-
torical, as well as logical, grounds. The establishment clause does 
not conflict with the free exercise clause; the "conflict" is due to the 
separationist interpretation of the clause. 
Understandably but nonetheless unfortunately, Curry's inquir-
ies have apparently been shaped by the historical debates in lawyers' 
briefs. Ever since Everson and McCollum, legal commentators have 
been preoccupied with the question: what is an "establishment of 
religion"? The First Freedoms helpfully draws attention to the ways 
the term "establishment" was used in the years preceding adoption 
of the first amendment. For reasons that remain mysterious, how-
ever, neither lawyers nor judges nor academics have seen fit to ask 
about the historical origins of the term "free exercise." Accord-
ingly, Curry does little, at least directly, to elucidate this equally 
important problem. 
His chapter, "Liberty of Conscience in Eighteenth-Century 
America," provides the attentive reader with much information to 
assist in the task, with ample instances of the factual circumstances 
that gave impetus to the concept of free exercise. Curry does not 
remark the fact, but many of these disputes, including the demand 
by religious dissenters for exemption from such general require-
ments as oath taking, military service, and tithing, in the name of 
"liberty of conscience," lend support to the Supreme Court's mod-
ern doctrine of religion-specific exemptions under the free exercise 
clause. In contrast to the "establishment" issue, however, the book 
contains little direct discussion of the terminological point. There is 
no discussion, for example, of the relation between the terms "lib-
erty of conscience" and "free exercise of religion." Surprisingly, 
The First Freedoms does not even discuss the most pertinent debate 
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on the matter: that between James Madison and George Mason 
over the wording of Virginia's "free exercise" provision, adopted in 
1776. Nor does the book attempt to draw any inferences from the 
legislative history of the free exercise clause itself. Perhaps these 
omissions are attributable to Curry's general reluctance to engage in 
close analysis of the language of legal sources, which (as already 
noted) weakens his presentation on the establishment clause as well. 
Whatever the reason, this omission of a linguistic history of the 
term "free exercise" contributes, presumably unintentionally, to the 
establishment-centered orientation of the history and doctrine of 
the religion clauses. 
The First Freedoms also gives insufficient attention to the rela-
tion between the Bill of Rights and the allocation of power between 
the federal government and the states. Since "incorporation" of the 
religion clauses against the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment, this issue has faded in practical importance, but it cannot be 
ignored by a historian-not least because a failure to appreciate the 
original concerns about states' rights makes the positions of the par-
ticipants difficult to understand. The debates over the religion 
clauses were as much about federalism as they were about religion. 
The establishment clause was specifically designed to preserve state 
prerogatives, including the prerogative to establish religion, against 
federal encroachment. A "law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion" is a law establishing, disestablishing, or in any way subjecting 
a state's religious establishment to federal control.w 
Curry makes no effort to explain the "respecting" language, or 
to place it in the context of the federalism debate. His sole recogni-
tion of the federalism aspect of the problem is to assert, unconvinc-
ingly, that Anti-federalists Patrick Henry and Elbridge Gerry, both 
supporters of a form of establishment in their respective states, 
could not have favored a "narrow" interpretation of the establish-
ment clause at the federal level, since they wanted to minimize the 
authority of the central government, and that for Madison to sup-
port a "narrow" interpretation would be an "inexplicable about 
tum," since it would "allow the federal government power over reli-
gion that he would not grant his own state." 
These matters are certainly complicated, but Curry's off-hand 
accusation of inconsistency is far from ineluctable. Henry and 
Gerry had political, as well as ideological, motivations to criticize 
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Madison's handiwork, and in any event a narrow interpretation of 
"establishment" perfectly accords with the understanding of the 
meaning of the word they displayed in their own states' debates. 
Madison, for his part, believed that the threat of factions (for which 
his paradigm was the religious sect) was far more serious at the 
state than at the federal level; thus it made perfect sense for him to 
insist on more stringent constitutional restrictions at the state than 
the federal level. 11 This does not prove, of course, that either 
Madison or the Anti-federalists favored a "narrow" interpretation, 
but only that Curry's account of the federalism aspect of the contro-
versy is too facile. 
The main value of The First Freedoms is not its analysis of legal 
documents-statutes, constitutional provisions, legislative debates. 
Curry is far too quick to dismiss arguments based on the language 
of these sources as "literalism." The book's great contribution is 
the seven chapters describing the actual church-state controversies 
that inspired the state and federal constitutional protections for reli-
gious liberty. These controversies place the religion clauses in a far 
different light than the popular conception based on Rutledge's dis-
sent in Everson. The religion clauses were not born in an Enlighten-
ment spirit of secular distrust of the influence of religion on public 
life. Far from it. As The First Freedoms demonstrates, they were 
born primarily of the efforts of intensely religious people (Quakers, 
Presbyterians, above all Baptists) to free themselves from the 
shackles of state interference and control. The religion clauses were 
not intended to be a force for secularization of American life. They 
were intended to create a regime of liberty in which each religious 
group could "flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the 
appeal of its dogma."l2 The First Freedoms is an important re-
minder of why we have a first amendment. 
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